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I was surprised when I read this report as I was not aware that European airlines have not adopted the "two-persons-in-the-cockpit" rule or the "four-eye-rule". It was recommended in 2016, but left to the airlines to adopt the practice, or not (link). It is a requirement in the US (link).

Lufthansa flight flew without a pilot for 10 minutes after copilot fainted, report finds
A Lufthansa flight with 205 people on board went without a pilot for 10 minutes last year after the copilot fainted while he was alone in the cockpit, according to a new report from Spain’s accident investigation authority.

The captain had briefly left the cockpit to use the lavatory when the copilot fainted during a flight from Frankfurt to Seville, Spain, on February 17, 2024, said the report from the agency, called CIAIAC.
...
The report said the captain returned from the bathroom and tried to open the cockpit door with a regular opening code, which chimes the cockpit. The captain made five attempts at this and a cockpit crew member also placed an intercom call to the flight deck. With no response, the captain used an emergency code to gain access and took control of the aircraft.
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  • Surprised 5
Posted (edited)
On 5/19/2025 at 1:03 PM, forcebwithu said:

I was surprised when I read this report as I was not aware that European airlines have not adopted the "two-persons-in-the-cockpit" rule or the "four-eye-rule". It was recommended in 2016, but left to the airlines to adopt the practice, or not (link). It is a requirement in the US (link).

Lufthansa flight flew without a pilot for 10 minutes after copilot fainted, report finds
A Lufthansa flight with 205 people on board went without a pilot for 10 minutes last year after the copilot fainted while he was alone in the cockpit, according to a new report from Spain’s accident investigation authority.

The captain had briefly left the cockpit to use the lavatory when the copilot fainted during a flight from Frankfurt to Seville, Spain, on February 17, 2024, said the report from the agency, called CIAIAC.
...
The report said the captain returned from the bathroom and tried to open the cockpit door with a regular opening code, which chimes the cockpit. The captain made five attempts at this and a cockpit crew member also placed an intercom call to the flight deck. With no response, the captain used an emergency code to gain access and took control of the aircraft.
...

I thought it was an industry wide rule nowadays after the German(?) guy commited suicide by flying into a mountain,thereby murdering his planeload of passengers.

It was Germanwings so you'd think Lufthansa would know better....

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32072218

Edited by coxyhog
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Posted
20 minutes ago, coxyhog said:

I thought it was an industry wide rule nowadays after the German(?) guy commited suicide by flying into a mountain,thereby murdering his planeload of passengers.

It was Germanwings so you'd think Lufthansa would know better....

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32072218

Below are the reasons given in the eurocockpit.eu report (linkwhy the practice hasn't been adopted.

IMHO, what overrides all their security concerns is the simple fact that the 2nd person on the flight deck would be able to immediately recognize when a pilot suddenly becomes incapacitated, and if necessary prevent the pilot from adversely affecting the flight controls during their medical emergency.

Security aspects

ECA believes that the "minimum occupancy" concept will not prove effective against the reoccurrence of the Germanwings situation, and does not support its continuation and/or implementation, for the following reasons:

§  Inferring that flight crews require monitoring when they are on their own in the flight deck risks reducing passenger confidence in the pilots, whose daily task and responsibility is to fly them safely to their destination.

§  The presence in the cockpit of a person with no operational knowledge will neither improve security nor safety. It might actually create new safety and operational concerns. For example, such persons would be unlikely to recognize, understand and let alone solve any operational issue such as a TCAS RA or an emergency descent

§ The increased number of people now needed to participate in accessing and leaving the flight deck has the potential to seriously compromise in-flight security as there will be early indications to the passengers of the door's opening, an increase in the number of times that the door will be operated, and/or in the amount of time it will stay open.

§The "minimum occupancy" concept extends the access to the cockpit to a category of staff, whose background security checks may – in some particular cases – be less rigorous than for pilots. This is particularly pertinent for those who may be employed on temporary contracts through employment agencies (in certain cases from non-European countries, e.g. in Asia), and for whom the ‘entry-barriers’ to the profession are significantly lower than for pilots (in terms of length of training and related costs). This has the potential to increase the security threat, rather than reducing it.

Finally, in many cases neither the cabin crew nor the pilots received any adequate guidance or training on the procedure to be followed, including where the cabin crew stands / sits in the cockpit and what they should do, thereby creating both uncertainty and a ‘hassle factor’ that can create distraction in the flight deck. On smaller aircraft there may not be a suitable location for them. This could also have consequences for the person concerned should the aircraft encounter significant turbulence. 
...

Conclusion

The "minimum occupancy" concept is NOT an effective security tool. Quite to the contrary, such a measure has the potential of introducing a risk higher than the one it is trying to prevent , and for which effective mitigating measures are not readily available.

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